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Abstract 
The paper examines what restrictions have to be imposed on the individual's preference 
structure for QALYs and HYEs to yield identical results. It is shown that using QALYs 
involves imposing three additional restrictions. Empirical evidence suggests that these 
restrictions cannot be expected to hold in all applications. The main problem in using HYEs 
appears to be practical. An alternative index is proposed, that may help to bridge the gap 
between QALYs and HYEs by combining to some extent the advantages of the two 
measures. 
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I. Introduction 
The evaluation of health care programs involves both technical and value 
judgements. The value judgements concern mainly the trade-off between the two 
important outcomes of such programs: quality of life gained and quantity of life 
gained. 
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The QALY approach offers one way of incorporating these two benefits of 
health care programs into one single index measure: quality adjusted life years 
gained. On the basis of this index decisions concerning the allocation of resources 
in the health care sector can be made. The program that should be implemented is
the one that offers the largest number of QALYs per dollar or, what is equivalent, 
the one that has lowest costs per QALY gained. 
The QALY approach as been criticized by several authors (e.g. Loomes and 
McKenzie, 1989; Mehrez and Gafni, 1989). The essence of this criticism is that 
since QALYs rely on certain fairly restrictive assumptions (Pliskin et al., 1980; 
Weinstein et al., 1980) as a representation f individuals' preferences, care should 
be taken in using them in the evaluation of health care programs. Mehrez and 
Gafni (1989) propose an alternative index, the Healthy Years Equivalents (HYEs), 
which as they claim, fully represents patients' preferences, temming from the way 
they are calculated from each individual's utility function. At the same time HYEs 
retain some attractive properties of QALYs: combining quality of life and quantity 
of life in a single index and being easy to interpret. 
The aim of this paper is to show how QALYs and HYEs are related to each 
other, that is, under what assumptions about the underlying preference structure 
they will give identical results. Both the certainty case and the uncertainty case 
will be considered. Moreover, it will be argued that the claim that HYEs fully 
represent an individual's preferences is not completely true. Even HYEs make 
simplifying assumptions concerning the individual's preference structure. Besides 
this theoretical reservation, the main problem in implementing HYEs to evaluate 
health care programs appears to be practical. An alternative index is proposed, 
which may help to bridge the gap between QALYs and HYEs by combining to 
some extent he advantages of the two measures. 
2. Quality-adjusted life years 
The basic QALY model, as it is typically encountered in the literature, is 
simple. Abstracting from discounting, i denote by qt the health status level in 
period t, where it is assumed without loss of generality that each period lasts one 
year. Assume that health status levels form a continuum. The number of QALYs 
I Two things hould be noted. First, discounting can be accounted for within this framework by 
imposing an additional stationarity assumption (Koopmans, 1972). Second, it is not clear that 
discounting of QALYs is necessary. Following the suggestions made by Torrance and Feeny (1989), 
health state utilities are measured over the individual's lifetime. Measuring health state utilities this 
way clearly incorporates time preference. 
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represented by the lifetime health stream Qr = (ql . . . . .  qt . . . . .  qr) where T is the 
number of years to live from now on, is 
T 
QALY = Y'~u(qt), (1) 
t= l  
where u(qt) is the utility associated with health status level q in period t. ~- 
By computing (1) for the various programs and dividing this amount by the 
costs one arrives at the decision rule maximize QALYs per unit of costs. 
In the rest of this paper I will refer to Eq. (1) as the QALY model. I will derive 
under what conditions an individual 's preferences can be represented by this utility 
function. One could object against this that by taking the basic version of the 
QALY model as the QALY model, it is a bit like assuming that the micro-eco- 
nomics of the firm is locked into the perfect competit ion assumptions. Meeting 
this objection requires an assessment of which assumptions are essential for the 
QALY concept and which are made for convenience ( ase of measurement). I will 
briefly comment on this in Section 7. 
3. Healthy years equivalents 
The calculation of HYEs is slightly more involved. Denote the lifetime health 
stream again by Qr = (qt . . . . .  qt . . . . .  qT ). The utility function over this stream is 
U(Qr), which represents the utility as viewed now by the individual. Denote q * 
as the best health state (generally perfect health) and q0 as the worst health state 
(generally death 3). Let H be the number of years in q* and H*  be the 
healthy-years equivalent of Qr.  The problem is now to find H * such that 
U(Ou* ) = U(Or ) ,  (2) 
where Qn* is a lifetime health profile with q t=q*  for t = 1 , . . . ,H*  and 
qt=q°  for t=H*  +1 . . . . .  T. 
In case the vNM axioms hold, Mehrez and Gafni (1991) have shown that HYEs 
can be measured by a two-stage lottery-based procedure. 
2 It has been pointed out to me by one of the referees that this equation is not correct, given that in 
health care evaluation it is the gain in OALYs that has to be measured rather than the total number of 
QALYs. However, this does not affect he results of this paper. Differences between utilities are only 
meaningful if additional axioms on top of the conditions derived in this paper are imposed on the 
individual's preference structure (see for example Krantz et al., 1971). 
3 Death need not necessarily be the worst health state. However, health states worse than death cause 
major theoretical problems. In the context of the QALY model health states worse than death cause a 
violation of one of the assumptions underlying the QALY model: mutual preferential/utility indepen- 
dence (see below). In the HYE model such health states may lead to negative values for the number of 
HYEs associated with a health care program. 
20 H. Bleichrodt /Journal of Health Economics 14 (1995) 17-37 
4. The certainty case: Value functions 
What conditions have to be imposed on the individual's preference structure to 
make QALYs and HYEs equivalent? First consider the case where the outcomes 
of a medical intervention are certain. In the case of certainty, an individual's 
preferences can ideally be captured by a value function which has the following 
properties: 
if x ~y  then v(x) >_ v(y), (3a) 
and 
if x~'y then v(x) > v(y ) ,  (3b) 
where x and y are vectors of attributes from which the individual derives value, 
one of which is health. If the individual's behaviour satisfies certain axioms 
(Debreu, 1954, Debreu, 1964) such a value function can be shown to exist. 
The QALY approach, again abstracting from discounting, assumes the follow- 
ing value function to measure individual preferences for a lifetime health stream 
Qr: 
T 
v(Qr )  = )-~v(qt) , (4) 
t= l  
which is an additively separable value function. 
Before deriving the assumptions sufficient for such an additive form to be a 
correct representation f the individual's preferences under certainty, it is useful to 
introduce some terminology. Suppose that there are n attributes from which an 
individual derives value: X1,. . .  ,X n. These attributes map each act a into a point 
X(a) = [X l (a )  . . . . .  Xn(a)] in the n-dimensional consequence space. Suppose fur- 
ther that the vector of attributes x can be subdivided into two subvectors y and z 
where 
y=(x  1 . . . . .  xr) and Z=(Xr+I ..... Xn). (5) 
Consider two values for the vector y, yl = (y~ . . . . .  y l)  and y2 = (yl  2 . . . . .  y2), and 
one for the vector z, z I = (z~_~ 1. . . .  ,z~) then 
Definition 1. yl is conditionally preferred or indifferent o y2 given Z 1 if and 
only if 
(yl, zl) (y2, z'). (6) 
Definition 2. The set of attributes Y = {X 1 . . . . .  X r} is preferentially independent 
of the complementary set Z= {Xr+ 1 . . . . .  X n} if and only if the conditional 
preference structure for y given z 1 does not depend on z 1. Or, Y is preferentially 
independent of Z iff for some z 1 
[ (y l ,z l )~(yE,z l ) ]=:~[(y l ,z)~(y2,z)] ,  Vz, y l ,y  2. (7) 
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Definition 3. The attributes X 1 . . . . .  X n are mutually preferentially independent 
if every subset Y of these attributes is preferentially independent of its comple- 
ment. 
Theorem 1 (Debreu, 1960). lff the attributes X1 . . . . .  X, are mutually preferen- 
tially independent and n > 3, the value function is of the additive form 
v(x  l . . . . .  x , )  = ~v i (x i ) ,  (8) 
i=1 
where ~,i is an additive value function over Xi. 
Generally, v and each of the single-attribute value functions v~ are scaled from 
0 to 1. Following this scaling convention the following form of the value function 
results 
v(x )  = ~ rivi( x,),  (9) 
i=1 
where the ~-~ are scaling constants. 
In the case of QALYs, the attributes of the value function are health status 
levels in different years. Thus, the value function, which is now a value function 
for health, consists of T attributes, health status levels in the various years 
(ql . . . . .  qr)  over which single-period value functions v t are defined. 
To arrive at the basic QALY formulation two more assumptions besides mutual 
preferential independence have to be imposed on the individual's value function: 
(1) Stable preferences over lifetime, i.e. all single-period value functions are 
identical. 
(2) All scaling constants are equal; this implies that improvements in health are 
equally important across periods. 
The number of HYEs in the certainty case is calculated by finding the value of 
H * for which 
v (Qr )  = v(Qt./. ), (10) 
where Qr and Q/4" are defined as before. 
Since HYEs do not impose any additional 4 restrictions on the individual's 
value function for health, QALYs and HYEs will yield identical results under the 
three assumptions derived above. 
Both the QALY approach and the HYE approach assume that the value 
function for health exists. That is, health and non-health attributes in the individ- 
ual's overall value function are assumed to be mutually preferentially independent. 
4 The HYE model, to give sensible results, has to impose a monotonicity condition: individual 
preferences have to be increasing with respect to healthy ears of life. Note that his assumption is also 
assumed by the QALY model. 
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In other words, preferences for lifetime health streams can be considered without 
consideration of other, non-health, attributes that bear value to the individual. 
Without this additional assumption, neither QALYs nor HYEs will correctly 
represent the individual's preferences under certainty. 
5. The uncertainty case: Utility functions 
Assume that expected utility is the appropriate criterion to use in choosing 
among alternatives 5. That is, an individual's preferences can be captured by a 
utility function which has the property that given two probability distributions A 
and B over the multi-attribute consequences, probability distribution A is at least 
as desirable as probability distribution B iff, 
Ea[u( i)] > Eb[u( ~)]. (11) 
where Ea and Eb are expectation operators taken with respect o distributions A
and B respectively. 
The utility function which describes the individual's behaviour is unique up to a 
positive linear transformation. Note that in the degenerate case, where one of the 
consequences occurs with probability one, the utility function reduces to a value 
function. Thus, a utility function is by definition a value function, but a value 
function is not necessarily a utility function. 
The QALY approach assumes that the utility of the lifetime health stream Qr 
can be assessed by the following utility function: 
T 
u(Qr) = Y'~u(qt), (12) 
t=l 
which is an additively separable utility function. 
An alternative way of representing the utility of the lifetime health stream Qr 
is by considering the two-attribute utility function u(T, q) where q is a constant 
health status level representing the stream of health status levels in the T years, q 
can be obtained, recall that health status has been assumed to form a continuum, 
by solving the following equation: 
u(q . . . . .  q) = u(Qr ) .  (13) 
This is the approach followed by Pliskin et al. (1980) (PSW). PSW consider the 
QALY representation 
u( T, q) = TUQ( q), (14) 
5 Recently, the use of expected utility as the appropriate d cision criterion has been challenged. For 
an overview of some recent developments in modelling preferences under uncertainty see for example 
Karni and Schmeidler (1991). 
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where  UQ represents the utility function for quality of life, and impose the 
following conditions on the individual's preference structure: 
(1) mutual utility independence between life years and health status (assuming the 
latter is constant across periods); 
(2) constant proportional trade-off of life years for health status; 
(3) risk neutrality with respect o life years. 
The definitions of utility independence and mutual utility independence are 
generalizations of Definitions 2 and 3 to the case of preferences defined over 
lotteries over attributes rather than over the attributes themselves. 
Definition 4. Attribute Y is utility independent of Z when conditional prefer- 
ences for lotteries on Y given Z do not depend on the particular level of Z. 
Definition 5. Attributes Y and Z are mutually utility independent if Y is utility 
independent of Z and Z is utility independent of Y. 
The assumption of a constant proportional trade-off of life years for health 
status implies that the proportion of remaining life years one is willing to give up 
for a given improvement in health status does not depend on the number of 
remaining life years. Risk neutrality over life years implies a linear utility function 
for life years. 
Assume that the individual's utility function for health exists, that is health and 
non-health attributes in the individual's overall utility function are mutually utility 
independent. Then the three conditions are sufficient for the QALY model to be a 
correct representation of the individual's utility function for health. 
Returning to Eq. (12), which is an alternative way of describing the utility 
function for a life time health stream, it can be asked under what conditions the 
intertemporal utility function reduces to this simple additive form. In answering 
this question, an alternative set of conditions is imposed on the utility function for 
health, which together have the same effect as the PSW conditions: a QALY can 
be considered a utility. 6 
Assume first that the attributes in the utility function for health (that is, health 
status levels in the various periods) be mutually utility independent. This assump- 
tion allows by applying Theorem 6.1 in Keeney and Raiffa (1976) to write the 
utility function for health either in the additive form 
T T 
u(q)= Y'~ktu,(q, ) if Y'~kt= l , (15a) 
t= l  t= l  
6 Note again that his is only true if health and non-health attributes in the individual's overall utility 
function are mutually utility independent. 
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or in the multiplicative form 
T T 
l+ku(q)=l - I [ l+kktut (q t ) ]  if )-"~k,~l, (15b) 
t= l  t= l  
where k and the various k t are scaling constants and u(q) and the various ut(qt) 
are normalized such that u(q * ) = ut(qt* ) = 1 and u(q °) = ut (q  O) = O. 
In order to decide whether the additive or the multiplicative form is appropriate, 
the condition of additive independence has to be checked. 
Definition 7. Attributes qa . . . . .  qr are additive independent if preferences over 
lotteries on ql . . . . .  qr depend only on their marginal probability distributions and 
not on their joint probability distribution. 
Theorem 2. The additive utility function 
T 
u( q) = ~~.ktut( q, ) (16) 
t=l 
is appropriate iff the attributes are additive independent, where 
(i) u and u t are normalized such that u(q* ) = 1; u(q °) = 0; ut(qt* ) : 1 and 
u,(q °) = 0; 
* 0 (ii) k t=u(q  ° . . . . .  qO_,, qt , qt+, . . . . .  qO). 
A sketch of the proof has been given in the Appendix. 
Additive independence is a stronger estriction than mutual preferential inde- 
pendence. Additive independence implies mutual preferential independence, but 
mutual preferential independence does not imply additive independence. Imposing 
additive independence means that the individual is indifferent between the treat- 
=((qt ,q t+ l  ), (qt ,q t+ l ) )  and T2=((qt*,q°+l), ' ment scenarios: T 1 0 o 1 • , ~, 2~ 
(qO, qt+l)) ' for any two periods t and t + 1. This is true, given that the marginal 
probabilities, which are the only basis for decision making in case additive 
independence holds, are equal and thus there should be indifference between the 
treatment scenarios. 
The final two conditions that have to be imposed are, as in the case of 
preferences under certainty, stable preferences over lifetime and equal scaling 
constants. Stable preferences imply that the utility function for health can be 
written as 
T 
u(q)  -- ~"~ktu(qt). (17) 
t=l 
The assumption of equal scaling constants implies that 
1 r 
- -u(q)  = ~-'~u(qt) , (18) 
C t= l  
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where (1/kt)u(q) measures the number of QALYs and c = k 1 = k 2 = . . .  = kr. 
Note that (1/kt)u(q) is still a utility function, since the utility function is unique 
up to a positive linear transformation a d 0 < c < 1. As in the certainty case, equal 
scaling constants imply that improvements in health status are equally important 
across periods. 
Since HYEs impose no additional 7 restrictions on the individual's utility 
function for health, the following assumptions are sufficient for QALYs and HYEs 
to yield identical results: (1) additive independence of health status levels in the 
various periods; (2) stable intertemporal preferences for health status; (3) equal 
weights attached to health improvements in various periods. Both the QALY-ap- 
proach and the HYE-approach assume that the single-attribute utility function for 
health exists. That is, health and non-health attributes in the individual's overall 
intertemporal utility function should be mutually utility independent. 
6. Recent challenges of the HYE model 
Recently the HYE approach has been challenged by various authors 
(Buckingham, 1993; Culyer and Wagstaff, 1993; Johannesson et al., 1993). Taken 
together, these authors raise three important points of criticism against he HYE: 
(1) The two-stage procedure to measure HYEs is nothing more than a complicated 
way of asking the time trade-off (Buckingham; Culyer and Wagstaff; Johan- 
nesson et al.) 
(2) HYEs are identical to QALY scores obtained from a time trade-off experiment 
(Culyer and Wagstaff). 
(3) HYEs assume risk neutrality with respect to healthy ears (Johannesson etal.). 
Since I have argued in Sections 4 and 5 that QALYs and HYEs are only 
equivalent under certain restrictive assumptions, the above papers clearly chal- 
lenge the results derived thus far. 
The first point mentioned above, i.e. the assertion that measuring HYEs by the 
two-stage standard gamble method proposed in Mehrez and Gafni (1991) will give 
identical results as measuring HYEs by a q-TO question, is strictly speaking not 
the topic of this paper, since the point is directed at the measurement procedure of 
the HYE rather than at the concept itself. Gafni et al. (1993) have responded to 
this objection by pointing out that measuring HYEs by the qTO method estab- 
lishes equality between v(Qn,) and v(Qr) whereas measuring HYEs by the 
two-stage procedure stablishes equality between u(Qn, ) and u(Qr). It should be 
clear from Sections 4 and 5 that in general value functions and utility functions are 
not identical and that there is no straightforward elationship between the two. 
Dyer and Sarin (1979, Theorems 4 and 5) have proved that a (measurable) value 
7 Again it has to be assumed that he utility function isincreasing in healthy ears. 
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function and a vNM utility function are only equivalent in the special case where 
mutual preferential independence and additive independence of the attributes are 
satisfied. However, from this argument i does not follow that HYEs elicited by 
the two stage procedure will differ from HYEs elicited by the TTO procedure. 
Value functions and utility functions differ in that they (generally) assign a 
different number to the same indifference class of consequences. This does not 
imply though that the consequences contained in an indifference class will be 
different. Indeed, as Loomes (1995) shows, under transitivity and monotonicity 
with respect to healthy years the number of HYEs elicited by the two stage 
procedure will be equal to the number of HYEs elicited by the TTO method. 
From the equivalence of the two measurement methods it does not follow that 
the second point of criticism, raised by Culyer and Wagstaff, that HYEs are as 
restrictive as QALY scores obtained from a time trade-off experiment, is correct 
though. Both the q-TO-based QALY and the HYE start by reducing health 
scenarios to their equivalent number of years in perfect health by eliciting the 
value of H* for which v(Qn. )  = v(Qr). This determines the number of HYEs 
and as long as monotonicity with respect o healthy years holds, one can use this 
number to consistently rank health scenarios according to the individual's prefer- 
ences. The TTO-based QALY approach makes two additional assumptions with 
respect o the individual's preference structure. First it is assumed that the profile 
Qr can be reduced to a profile of constant health status (ql), which is a continuity 
assumption with respect o health status, and second that the value H * /T  can be 
attached to ql and can be used in subsequent analyses where the number of years 
in ql is not necessarily equal to T. This is only justified if the assumptions 
outlined in Section 4 hold. 
Finally, the claim made by Johannesson et al., that HYEs assume risk neutrality 
with respect o healthy life years, is based on the misconception that a HYE is a 
utility, that can be used in expected utility calculations, rather than an argument in 
the utility function. If the utility function for health is increasing in healthy years, 
HYEs will be a correct representation of the individual preferences for health 
without having to impose any further restriction on this utility function. 
7. An assessment of the various assumptions 
Having argued that HYEs and QALYs can theoretically differ, it can be asked 
whether it is likely that in practice they will differ. This amounts to an empirical 
assessment of the various assumptions. The present section will show that the 
QALY assumptions have been violated. It should be borne in mind though that the 
empirical evidence relates to the basic QALY model. This raises the question 
about what is intrinsic to a QALY. In my view, given that a QALY is essentially a 
weighting scheme in which life years are adjusted for quality of life levels, 
separability of life years and quality of life is essential to the QALY. This makes 
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the independence assumptions essential for a QALY-type of health outcome 
measure. The assumptions of stable preferences and equal weights to health 
improvements are merely "convenience assumptions" which could be relaxed. 
Note though that these "convenience assumptions" are typically made in empiri- 
cal work, given that in their absence the assessment task becomes highly involved. 
7.1. The certainty case 
It has been shown in Section 4 that under certainty, the QALY model relies on 
three assumptions: mutual prefential independence, stable intertemporal prefer- 
ences and equal weights being attached to health improvements. 
Mutual preferential independence over periods implies that preferences for 
health status in any two subsequent periods do not depend on the levels of health 
status in the other periods. Note first that this assumption is in clear conflict with 
one of the major contributions to the theory of health economics: the model of the 
demand for health by Michael Grossman (1972). Moreover, intuitively one would 
not expect mutual preferential independence to hold for every health profile. 
(qt ,  qt + 1 ) and (qt °, qO+ 1) are Especially in case preferences between the pairs l 1 
being considered with ql denoting a health status level only slightly preferred to 
death, one would expect hese preferences to be influenced by health status levels 
in other periods. Evidence of this has been reported by Sutherland et al. (1982). 
Sutherland et al. showed that attitudes toward survival in various health states 
change with the time of additional increments in survival in these health states. A 
majority of their subjects preferred three months of survival (followed by death) to 
immediate death, even in highly dysfunctional health states. However, for the most 
dysfunctional health states a majority of subjects preferred immediate death to 8 
years of survival in these health states (followed by death). These findings suggest 
the existence of some sort of threshold ("maximal endurable time" as Sutherland 
et al. call it) above which increments in survival are negatively valued. Note that 
the existence of a "maximal endurable time" is in conflict with mutual preferen- 
tial independence: preferences for health states within a period cannot be consid- 
ered without taking into account health status levels in other periods. It also 
suggests that mutual preferential independence is most likely to hold either when 
the deviation from normal health takes place for a relatively short period or when 
the deviation is not severe. Unfortunately it is precisely in the evaluation of severe 
and/or chronic conditions that the QALY approach as typically been applied. 
It is easy to show that equal scaling constants ~i and stable preferences over 
time together imply a constant proportional trade-off of life years for health status. 
The available empirical evidence does not support this constant proportional 
trade-off assumption. Sackett and Torrance (1978), measuring the values of 
different health states by the time trade-off technique, found evidence of an 
increasing rather than a constant proportional trade-off: the value both patients and 
members from the general public assigned to various health states decreased 
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dramatically with increases in the number of years spent in those health states. 
Pliskin et al. (1980) also confronted the subjects in their study with some time 
trade-off questions. Out of 30 questions only 9 answers were consistent with a 
constant proportional trade-off. Of these 9 consistent answers, 5 were such that the 
subject indicated that he/she was willing to trade-off no life years at all against 
improvements in health status. Eliminating these cases leaves only 4 out of 25 
cases that were consistent with the constant proportional trade-off assumption. 
If the constant proportional trade-off assumption is not tenable, it can be asked 
which of the two constituent assumptions, table intertemporal preferences or 
equal weights being given to health improvements across periods, is most likely to 
cause the violation. Positive time preference has the effect of imposing different 
values for the ~'i's. More precisely, less weight will be given to health status levels 
further away in time and this can explain why increasing proportional trade-offs 
have been observed. The common practice of discounting QALYs can capture this 
phenomenon. However, discounting is unlikely to solve all problems. As empirical 
evidence suggests (Loomes and McKenzie, 1989), people attach different weights 
to being healthy at various stages of the life-cycle. Ideally the scaling factors 
should reflect his by giving more weight to the value function for health status in 
those years (generally childhood and early parenthood). However, simply dis- 
counting QALYs will not adequately represent this. 
Concerning the stability of preferences over time, Sackett and Torrance (1978) 
found that elderly have somewhat different preferences for health status as 
assessed by the time trade-off method than younger people. The differences are 
small though. Moreover, even if significant differences would have been obtained, 
this would only have counted as weak evidence. Strong evidence can only be 
obtained by cohort studies. To date no such studies have been reported. 
7.2. The uncertainty case 
In Section 5 it has been shown that under uncertainty he QALY model imposes 
additive independence, stable intertemporal preferences and equal weights for 
equal health improvements across periods on the individual's utility function. 
Additive independence is a strong condition. It implies indifference between 
level health status streams and single-period health status. That is, the life-time 
certainty equivalent q+=(q~ ,. . . ,q~) for the treatment scenario (q*,  7,1 q0) 
where the q-vectors indicate life-time health status level streams, and the one-period 
certainty equivalent qt +÷ for the treatment scenario (qt*, ½, q?), are by additive 
independence equal. Also as has been noticed before, additive independence 
implies indifference between the treatment scenarios T 1 =((qt*,qt+l ), ½, 
(q° ,q°+l ) )  and T2=((qt*,q?+l) , 1 * 7, (q°t, qt+ 1))" 
Intuitively, one would not expect additive independence to hold. People are 
generally more risk averse with respect o life-time streams than with respect o 
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one-period streams and, therefore, it can be expected that qt + < qt ++. Moreover, 
mixed scenarios uch as T2 will generally be preferred to extreme scenarios uch 
as T 1. 
No direct empirical evidence exists on the appropriateness of the additive 
independence assumption. Torrance et al. (1982,1992) found clear evidence that 
the additive multi-attribute utility function was not appropriate, that is additive 
independence had to be rejected, in their evaluations of neonatal intensive care of 
very low birth weight infants and of long term sequelae of childhood cancer. 
Similarly, Eriksen and Keller (1993) rejected the additive specification of the 
multiattribute utility function for the toxicity and efficacy of drugs. However, the 
multi-attribute functions assessed in these studies are one-period functions. It 
might be questioned though whether, given that additive independence does not 
hold for one-period multi-attribute utility functions, it is reasonable to assume that 
it will hold for multi-period multi-attribute utility functions. 
If additive independence is considered to be too strong a condition, mutual 
utility independence might still hold. To my knowledge mutual utility indepen- 
dence has not been examined with respect o preferences for health. Studies that 
have assessed multi-attribute utility functions for health status like the ones by 
Torrance et al. and Eriksen and Keller have typically assumed mutual utility 
independence to hold, given that without this assumption the task would become 
very tedious. One could hypothesize that the results of Sutherland et al. generalize 
to the case where preferences for uncertain lifetime health scenarios rather than 
preferences for certain scenarios are considered. That is, if confronted with a 
choice between health status level q) for certain and treatment with probability p
of success, it can in general not be assumed that the outcome of this choice 
problem is independent of the health status levels in the other periods. In case the 
results of Sutherland et al. do indeed carry over to preferences over uncertain 
outcomes, mutual utility independence is most likely to be violated in the case of 
relatively serious and/or chronic illnesses. 
Together additive independence, equal scaling constants and stable preferences 
imply a constant proportional trade-off of life years for health status. Some 
additional empirical evidence is available about the appropriateness of this as- 
sumption under uncertainty. McNeil et al. (1981) found that individuals were only 
willing to trade-off life-years against improvements in health status level (in their 
study a change from less than perfect speech to normal speech) if the number of 
remaining life-years was more than five. Even if the number of remaining 
life-years was larger than 5, individuals did not behave according to the constant 
proportional trade-off assumption, but rather according to the principle of increas- 
ing proportional trade-off. In principle both unequal scaling constants and unstable 
intertemporal preferences could cause this violation. More research on whether 
individuals place different weights on different phases in their life-cycle and on 
whether standard gamble valuations of health states vary with age is necessary 
before anything definitive can be said. 
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The three QALY assumptions also impose risk neutrality with respect o life 
years. This is easily seen by observing that Eq. (12) is linear with respect o life 
years. McNeil et al. (1978) found risk aversion with respect to life years in a group 
of patients with operable bronchogenic carcinoma. The same authors also found 
risk aversion with respect o life years in a group of subjects from the general 
public in their study about the trade-offs between speech and survival (McNeil et 
al., 1981). 
As the available vidence suggests, it should not be expected that the assump- 
tions underlying the QALY model will in general be satisfied. Even though some 
of the basic QALY assumptions can in principle be relaxed, QALYs and HYEs are 
likely to yield different results. This will not necessarily lead to reversals of 
preferences though. It remains to be shown how likely these reversals are to occur 
in practice. 
Finally, as has been outlined in Sections 4 and 5, both the QALY and the HYE 
approach assume that preferences for health can be considered separately, that is 
health and non-health attributes in the individual's preference structure are inde- 
pendent. Empirical evidence on the appropriateness of this assumption is scarce. 
Viscusi and Evans (1990) have studied wage-risk trade-offs in a sample of 
chemical workers. They found that the utility of wealth depended on the state of 
health. More precisely, the marginal utility of wealth decreased with decreases in
health status level. This result challenges the assumption of an overall utility 
function in which all attributes are utility independent of their respective comple- 
ments. Rejecting this assumption means rejecting the multilinear form of the utility 
function. Rejecting the multilinear specification of the utility function means 
rejecting the multiplicative and additive specifications since these are special cases 
of the multilinear utility function. More research is clearly necessary, but Viscusi 
and Evans' results suggest hat even decision making based on HYEs may give 
misleading results. 
8. Possible pitfalls of HYEs 
Though, as has been argued above, a HYE will not by definition correctly 
represent the individual's preference structure, the HYE approach is theoretically 
sounder than the QALY approach. In using HYEs, one does not need to worry 
about he assumptions of additive independence, equal weights for equal improve- 
ments in health status in any phase of the life cycle and stable preferences over 
time. HYEs are more general than QALYs and therefore more likely to reflect 
individual preferences. 
Unfortunately this greater theoretical soundness i achieved at a cost: eliciting 
HYEs is a rather time-consuming and complicated task. In case of a health care 
program yielding different possible health status outcomes and a probability 
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distribution of survival years, the HYE task becomes very cumbersome. Mehrez 
and Gafni (1991) propose an approximation technique to solve this problem. 
However, if an approximation technique is used it can no longer be claimed that 
"the advantage of the HYE measure ... is that it stems directly from the 
individual utility function and thus fully reflects the individual's preferences" 
(Mehrez and Gafni, 1991). The price paid for an increase in practical feasibility is 
a decrease in theoretical soundness. 
A further problem is associated with the use of HYEs as a societal decision 
rule. The HYE has been developed as an individual measure of preference. 
However, resource allocation decisions in health care are typically societal deci- 
sions, requiring the aggregation of the preferences of individuals. The HYE in its 
original form cannot address this kind of question since it gives no guidance 
concerning the aggregation procedure. Gafni and Birch (1991) have shown how 
HYEs can be made consistent with several aggregation procedures (equity algo- 
rithms as they call them). However, it should be noted that each of these equity 
algorithms imposes a specific type of utility function on the individuals constitut- 
ing society. For example, in subscribing to the equity principle that a life in full 
health should be given equal weight for every member of society, society 
implicitly imposes the following type of utility function for health on its individu- 
als: 
U(Q,T) = U(Q,T* ) + U(Q,T -  T* ), (19) 
where T denotes the individual's total lifetime, T* denotes the individual's 
remaining lifetime and T -  T * denotes the time lived so far by the individual. 
It is somewhat contradictory that an approach which claims its superiority on 
the basis of imposing no restrictions whatsoever on the individual utility function 
for health, ends up by imposing restrictions on this utility function in order to be 
applicable in societal decision making concerning the allocation of health care 
resources. However, even as a societal decision rule, the HYE approach still 
allows more freedom to the individual utility function than the QALY approach. 
Note that within the above adjustment algorithm there is an additional problem: 
the selection of an appropriate value for full lifetime T. As Gafni and Birch 
observe, either individuals who are not newly borns have to evaluate health states 
for negative periods of time or individuals have to perceive xtreme lengths of life. 
It is a well-known result from the literature on choice under uncertainty that 
reference levels exert a major influence on individual risk attitudes (Schoemaker, 
1982; Tversky and Kahneman, 1991; Luce et al., 1993). Setting unrealistic 
reference states is likely to lead to unrepresentative results. Using QALYs does not 
offer an easy way out of this problem. As Gafni and Birch have shown, applying 
QALYs as a societal decision rule requires making equity judgements as well. If 
one is willing to accept he equity principle that a life in full health should count 
equally for every individual, this requires, as in the HYE model, the specification 
of a reference state. 
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9. A compromise between QALYs and HYEs 
In the previous sections it has been argued that both QALYs and HYEs have 
their pros and cons. QALYs are only under fairly restrictive assumptions equal to 
utilities, but are easy to measure. HYEs on the other hand more closely reflect the 
individual's preference structure, though without being an exact representation f 
it in every situation. This greater theoretical soundness is achieved at a price: a 
more involved measurement procedure. Moreover, applying the HYE model as a 
societal decision rule involves sacrificing some theoretical soundness. It would be 
appealing to have a measure that combines the advantages of both measures, while 
at the same time avoiding their disadvantages. In this section an index is proposed 
that to some extent attains this rather ambitious goal. 
The most restrictive assumption of the QALY-procedure seems to be additive 
independence of the health states in different periods. If additive independence is 
replaced by the weaker condition of mutual utility independence, the utility 
function for health becomes: 8
u(q) = 1/k [1 -k-kktut(qt)] - 1 , (20) 
where 
(1) u(.) and ut(qt) have been normalized, 
(2) k t "= u(qt*  , qt O) with qt denoting the complement of qt and ~k  t 4: 1, 
l 
(3) k is a scaling constant that is a solution to 
T 
1 + k = 1--I(1 + kkt). (21) 
t= l  
Equivalently, (20) can be written as 
T 
ku(q) + 1 = 1-I[1 +kktut(qt)]. (22) 
t= l  
Recall that utility functions are unique up to a positive linear transformation. Thus, 
if k > 0 then u+(q) = ku(q) + 1 and u+(qt  ) = 1 + kktut(qt) are also utility 
functions and 
T 
u+(q)  = Hu+(qt ) .  (23)  
t= l  
8 For a proof of this result see Keeney and Raiffa (1976). 
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If k < 0 then u+(q) = - [ku(q)  + 1] and u+(qt ) = - [1  + kktut(qt)] are utility 
functions o again 
T 
u+ ( q) = I--~u+ ( q,). (24) 
t=l 
So even when additive independence is relaxed to mutual utility independence, the 
procedure to calculate the number of utilities associated with a health care 
program is still rather simple. 
One problem remains: the assessment of the scaling constants (k and the 
various kt ' s ) .  This task can be greatly simplified though by imposing the (conveni- 
ence) assumption of equal kt's for every phase in the life cycle. Under this 
assumption, the easiest way to proceed is by determining kI from the following 
standard gamble question: determine p* such that (q l ,  qO . . . .  ,qr0) ~ 
((ql*, . . . .  q.~ ), p , , (qO 1. . . . .  qO)). That is compare the certainty of one year in full 
health with a treatment option which offers a probability p * of success (full health 
for the rest of life) and a probability 1 -p*  of failure (immediate death). The 
indifference value p* is equal to k t which is equal to all other kt's by 
assumption. Once the T values of k t are known, k can be solved from Eq. (21). 
This gives all the information ecessary to calculate u ÷ from (24). 
The proposed aggregation procedure depends on the adopted equity principle 
(Gafni and Birch, 1991). For example, if it is accepted that one healthy year 
should count equally for each individual, the procedure is as follows. Set the 
difference between u(qt*) and u(q°t) equal to 1 for every individual in each time 
period and aggregate these individual values into societal values. Similarly aggre- 
gate the various individual kt's in a set of societal kt's. From these the societal 
value of k can be calculated. 
In the derivation of the above index, use has been made of two assumptions: 
mutual utility independence and equal values of k t. 9 It cannot be expected that 
these assumptions will hold in every situation. The assumption of equal values for 
the different kt's can  be made less restrictive by introducing discount rates. 
However, as has been noted above, this will not solve all problems. Alternatively, 
the weights associated with different phases of the life-cycle could be directly 
assessed by asking more questions. For obvious reasons, this requires replacing 
death as the worst health state. However, even then subjects may find it hard to 
imagine profiles of the type (q0, qO . . . . .  qO 1' qt*, qO . . . . .  qr°). Therefore, a 
reformulation of the model in a disutility format is to be recommended. Such a 
procedure is more likely to produce reliable answers. 
Even some violations of mutual utility independence are allowed. Since health 
status is made up of several dimensions, e.g. mobility, pain, self-care, the 
9 Note also that it is still assumed that he axioms of expected utility theory hold. 
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attributes of the lifetime utility function for health are vectors consisting of scores 
on these various dimensions. That is, the various component utility functions ut(.) 
are themselves multiattribute utility functions nested within a higher level multiat- 
tribute utility function. Nesting multiattribute utility functions provides additional 
degrees of freedom, which permit trade-offs between two attributes to depend on 
other attributes. This allows for some violation of the mutual utility independence 
assumption. 
Stable intertemporal preferences can but need not necessarily be assumed. 
Calculating utilities for various age groups and testing whether these are signifi- 
cantly different seems the appropriate procedure before stability of preferences 
over time can be assumed. 
10. Concluding remarks 
It is not claimed that the above index is the ideal one. Still some restrictive 
assumptions have been made even though the implications of these assumptions 
can be relaxed by discounting, reformulation of the model in a disutility format 
and by nesting the component one-attribute utility functions. The above index 
attempts to combine the advantages of using QALYs (easy to calculate) with those 
of HYEs (theoretically sound at the individual evel). The above index is easier to 
calculate than HYEs though not as easy as QALYs given that extra questions have 
to be asked to determine the kt's. The index more closely approaches the 
individual utility function than the QALY model, given that less restrictive 
asumptions have been imposed on the individual's preference structure. 
Problems arise when health status levels worse than death have to be evaluated. 
In such cases mutual utility independence is violated. Though nesting may solve 
some problems, extreme care should be taken in applying the index to evaluate 
health status levels worse than death. On the other hand, in such cases the QALY 
procedure cannot be applied either and the existence of HYEs is not guaranteed as 
Mehrez and Gafni (1991) show. How best to handle health outcomes worse than 
death remains an important issue on the research agenda for outcome measurement 
in health. At the moment, the recommended procedure is to use several measures 
and to test extensively for the sensitivity of the results obtained. 
The step from QALYs to HYEs implied relaxing several restrictions that had 
been imposed on the individual's preference structure. The above index is in fact a 
step backwards on the road between QALYs and HYEs, since a restriction (mutual 
utility independence) has been re-introduced. An alternative course would be to 
take the opposite direction and investigate the implications of relaxing even more 
assumptions. This would lead to a sort of Grossman formulation in which the 
individual's overall utility function can no longer be assumed to be separable. 
Exploration of this road is an interesting topic for future research. 
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Appendix 1 
Theorem 2 can be proved by combining Theorems 5.1 and 6.4 in Keeney and 
Raiffa (1976), which are based on results derived by Fishburn (1965, 1970). 
Consider first an individual who only lives two periods. Given additive 
independence this individual will be indifferent between the treatment scenarios 
((ql,  q2 ), 1, (q0, qO)) and ((ql,  q~), 1 7, (q l  0, q2 ))  since they have the same 
marginal probability distribution on quality of life levels in the two periods. 
Equating expected utilities and setting u(q °, q2 °) = 0, which is allowed given 
~U(ql, -~U(ql, q2)" _~U(ql, qe) = qO) + I 0 freedom to scale the utility function gives 1 
Defining u(ql, q° )=ktu l (q l )  and u(q° ,qe)=k2u2(q2)  to allow for free 
scaling of the single period utility functions gives the additive form of the 
multi-attribute utility function. 
The generalization to the T period case is straightforward. Define Y as 
{q2 . . . . .  qr}" Then from the above u(Q r)  = klUl(ql)+ kvuy(q2,. . .  ,qr)" 
Break down Ug by defining Z as {q3 . . . . .  qr}. Apply the above again to yield: 
uy(q2 . . . . .  qr) = k2u2(q2) + kzuz(q3 . . . . .  qr). 
Proceeding this way and substituting the obtained expressions in each other 
gives the additive multi-attribute utility function. 
That the additive multi-attribute utility function implies additive independence 
can immediately be derived by calculating the expected utilities of the treatment 
scenarios. 
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